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The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending  
 
 
Abstract 
 
We investigate whether a borrower’s media coverage influences syndicated loan origination and 
participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and 
interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders 
that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, non-relationship lenders competing to 
serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed 
syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders 
compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a 
borrower. We extrapolate and extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the 
likelihood of less informed lenders serving as lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is 
increasing in the sentiment of media-initiated, borrower-specific articles published prior to loan 
origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, non-relationship lenders have 
a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a 
previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of 
loans and (4) loan spreads decrease. 
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1. Introduction 
An important source of public information about a firm is the business press. There is 
substantial evidence that the business press provides information about firm fundamentals to 
equity market participants, incremental to that provided by other information intermediaries and 
accounting data (e.g., Tetlock et al., 2008), and reduces information asymmetries between equity 
investors (e.g., Bushee et al., 2010). However, there is little research examining the role played 
by the media in private lending markets. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which media 
coverage of borrowers influences the loan origination and participation decisions of 
informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and interest rate spreads.  
A defining feature of equity markets is that investors do not generally have privileged 
access to firms’ confidential information as securities law prohibits unequal access to such 
information. This creates scope for the media to serve as an information intermediary to equity 
investors seeking information from sources external to the firm.1 In contrast, private debt 
markets are not subject to securities laws, allowing lenders significant access to private 
information from borrowers as an integral part of the lending process. Syndicated loans involve 
multiple lenders where the degree of access to borrowers’ inside information can differ 
substantially across lenders. Such differential access to information creates information 
asymmetries between lenders at two levels.  
First, syndicated lending involves information asymmetry between inside lenders with a 
prior relationship with a borrower and outside, non-relationship lenders competing for a mandate 
to serve as lead arranger on a borrower’s loan.2 Non-relationship lenders are typically at an 
                                                 
1 Bushee et al. (2010) define an information intermediary as an agent that provides information that is new and 
useful to other parties, either because it has not been publicly released or widely disseminated.  
2 A lead arranger establishes a relationship with the borrower and has primary responsibility for information 
collection, ex-ante due diligence, distributing shares of the loan to syndicate participants and ex-post monitoring, 
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information disadvantage relative to relationship lenders. Through sustained engagement, 
relationship lead banks gain extensive inside knowledge of a borrower’s operations and develop 
private channels of communication with its managers. Borrowers are also inclined to reveal 
sensitive private information to relationship lenders (e.g., Greenbaum and Thakor, 1995, Boot, 
2000, and Bharath et al., 2009).3 Second, information asymmetries exist between lead banks and 
other syndicate participants.4 Although syndicate participants may receive some private 
information from the lead bank or borrower, they are generally at an information disadvantage 
relative to the lead bank because they primarily maintain an arm’s-length relationship with the 
borrower, while the lead bank has the primary due diligence and monitoring responsibilities 
(e.g., Lee and Mullineaux, 2004, Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009).  
Outside lenders, analogous to equity investors, have incentives to seek credit-relevant 
information about a borrower to mitigate their information disadvantage relative to more 
informed inside lenders.5 To the extent that the media transmits information to less informed 
lenders about a borrower’s credit fundamentals that is incremental to information they receive 
from other sources, it can directly impact relative information asymmetries across lenders and 
influence loan syndicate formation and pricing. We investigate the informational role of the 
media in syndicated lending by employing a quantitative measure of media sentiment in business 
press articles about a borrower. Using data from RavenPack News Analytics, we construct a 
measure that reflects the average sentiment across all full size borrower-specific articles 
                                                                                                                                                             
among other duties. The lead arranger receives a fee for arranging and managing the syndicated loan. We discuss 
institutional aspects of syndicated lending in more detail in section 2.1. 
3 The idea that inside banks have an information advantage is well established in the literature (e.g., Kane and 
Malkiel, 1965, Fama, 1985, Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia, 1989, Sharpe, 1990, Rajan, 1992, Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994, 1995, and Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2004). 
4 We use the terms lead arranger and lead bank interchangeably.  
5 For parsimony, we often refer to lead arrangers with a relationship to a borrower and participant banks with a 
relationship to the lead arranger or a borrower as inside lenders, and other lenders as outside lenders. The premise is 
that inside lenders are better informed than outside lenders. 
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published over the six-month period preceding loan origination (Media Sentiment). RavenPack’s 
sentiment measure reflects assessments of the tone of the news in a given article (i.e., positive or 
negative news) as well as the strength of the news the article contains.6  
We first investigate if media influences competition between inside and outside lenders for 
the mandate to serve as lead arranger on a borrower’s loan. This analysis builds on the model 
from Rajan (1992) in which an informed (inside) bank in a current lending relationship with a 
risky borrower competes with less informed (outside) banks to supply new financing to a 
borrower. Inside banks exploit their information advantage by opportunistically bidding only for 
good loans while avoiding bad loans. Because inside banks avoid bad loans, outside lenders are 
exposed to adverse selection as they face significant risk of loss if they bid. Outside lenders 
respond by moderating how aggressively they compete, becoming more reluctant to participate 
as their assessed probability that a loan is bad increases. Rajan (1992) further considers how 
public information signals about a borrower shape competitive dynamics, showing that outside 
lenders’ willingness to compete increases in the sentiment of the signal. A more favorable signal 
increases outside lenders assessment of loan quality, reducing their risk of getting stuck with a 
bad loan and increasing the aggressiveness with which they compete against an inside lender. In 
contrast, a less favorable signal decreases outside lenders’ willingness to compete due to 
heightened adverse selection concerns driven by lower assessed loan quality.  
A direct implication of Rajan (1992) is that the more (less) aggressively outsiders bid, the 
higher (lower) is the probability of their winning the loan deal. We extrapolate this economic 
reasoning to syndicated loans where inside, relationship lenders and outside, non-relationship 
                                                 
6 RavenPack employs a variety of textual analysis algorithms to quantify the extent of positive or negative sentiment 
in news articles. Its sentiment measure is distinct from the notion of investor sentiment, which generally refers to 
beliefs not supported by prevailing fundamentals (e.g., Tetlock, 2007, and Baker and Wurgler, 2006). 
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lenders compete to be selected by a borrower as a lead arranger of the syndication.7 We 
empirically investigate whether media sentiment is associated with the probability that the lead 
arranger of a loan is an outside lender with no established relationship with a borrower. 
Consistent with the impact of more favorable public signals on outsiders’ bidding strategy as 
shown by Rajan (1992), we hypothesize that the aggressiveness with which outside lenders 
compete to arrange a loan is increasing in media sentiment, thus raising their probability of 
winning the loan. We find that the probability of a non-relationship lender serving as a lead 
arranger is higher when media sentiment is more positive. A one standard deviation increase in 
media sentiment increases the probability that a loan is syndicated by a non-relationship lead 
arranger by 6.2%. 
Having examined competition between inside and outside lenders for the lead arranger job, 
we next consider whether the media influences the willingness of lenders to participate in a loan 
syndicate. We classify as more informed inside participants those lenders who have a previous 
relationship with either the borrower or a loan’s lead arranger (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 
2009), and as less informed outside participants those without a relationship. We hypothesize 
that the willingness of less informed lenders to participate in a loan syndicate is increasing in 
media sentiment. Because a lead arranger has an information advantage relative to syndicate 
participants and its monitoring effort after a loan closes is unobservable, participants face both 
adverse selection and moral hazard problems (e.g., Sufi, 2007, Ivashina, 2009, and Mora, 2015).  
While it is difficult to empirically distinguish between adverse selection and moral hazard, we 
argue that media can influence lenders’ participation through either channel.  
To motivate an adverse selection explanation, we extend the economic reasoning from 
                                                 
7 The first step in the syndication process is for a borrower to select the lead arranger from the set of competing 
banks. After being selected, the lead arranger begins the task of inviting potential participant lenders to fund part of 
the loan. Once participants agree to fund part of the loan, the loan agreement is signed by all parties.  
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Rajan (1992) to loan syndicates where loan participants compete to become syndicate members. 
In forming a syndicate, a lead bank sends out invitations to a large set of potential lenders who 
choose whether to bid on joining the syndicate (Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007). As noted 
by Ivashina and Sun (2011), the syndication process can be viewed as an auction where loan 
participants submit sealed bids to the lead arranger. The same winner’s curse issue developed in 
Rajan (1992) plausibly operates here to the extent that inside participants pursue good loans, 
leaving bad loans for less informed bidders. Analogous to Rajan (1992), media can influence the 
severity of the winner’s curse problem, where more positive media signals increase the 
willingness of non-relationship (less informed) lenders to bid for loan participation.  
Under moral hazard, syndicate participants are concerned about ex-post monitoring efforts 
of the lead arranger, where monitoring becomes more crucial for troubled borrowers (Sufi, 
2007). If media reveals negative news, outside participants plausibly downgrade their assessment 
of loan quality, which increases their concern about the lead arranger shirking. Thus outside 
participants may be less likely to join a syndicate than relationship participants with superior 
information about the lead arranger and/or the borrower. Similar to the adverse selection case, 
outside lenders may either not submit bids or submit bids that are rejected by the lead arranger in 
favor of superior bids by relationship participants. Based on these arguments, we predict that the 
probability of non-relationship syndicate participants joining the syndicate increases in media 
sentiment. We find evidence consistent with this prediction: a one standard deviation increase in 
Media Sentiment increases the probability that a participant without a prior relationship with the 
borrower (lead arranger) joins the syndicate by 7.1% (9.3%).   
Next, we examine the proportion of a loan retained by the lead bank. Due to adverse 
selection and moral hazard concerns, syndicate participants require lead arrangers to put skin in 
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the game by holding a proportion of the loan that is increasing in the severity of the agency 
problem (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977, Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997, and Sufi, 2007). Because, as 
argued above, more positive public signals are expected to decrease both adverse selection and 
moral hazard risks faced by less informed syndicate participants, we hypothesize that the loan 
share retained by the lead arranger (i.e., the lead’s skin in the game) is decreasing in media 
sentiment.  We show that a one standard deviation increase in media sentiment decreases this 
proportion by 5.3%. 
Finally, we investigate whether more positive media sentiment is associated with lower 
interest rate spreads. We hypothesize that if, as argued earlier, loan attractiveness to non-
relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants increases when media sentiment is more 
positive, the expanded set of potential lenders willing to fund the loan will increase the supply of 
credit available to the borrower and put downward pressure on interest spreads. We find that 
interest rate spreads are decreasing in media sentiment: a one standard deviation increase in 
Media Sentiment translates into a 6.9 basis point decrease in the spread.   
Our previous analyses presume that the media provides new information to less informed 
lenders by publicly revealing either private information known to inside but not outside lenders, 
or information not previously known by either inside or outside lenders. To bolster this claim, we 
show that our findings with respect to lead arranger choice, syndicate participation, lead arranger 
share and interest spreads are robust to controlling for alternative public information sources, 
including equity analysts, credit rating agencies and firm-initiated press releases. Further, we 
split our sample into partitions based on the extent of borrowers’ analyst coverage. Prior research 
suggests that financial analysts provide useful information to lenders (e.g., Guntay and 
Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2011). This suggests that when analyst information is scarce, 
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lenders face more uncertainty about borrowers’ prospects and rely more on alternative 
information sources. We predict that if media is informative to outside lenders, then the effect of 
media sentiment on private lending practices will be stronger when equity analyst coverage is 
less intensive. Consistently, we find that syndicate structure and loan spreads are more sensitive 
to media sentiment when analyst coverage is lower. We further find some evidence that the 
effect of media sentiment is stronger for borrowers that experience an exogenous reduction in 
analyst coverage preceding loan issuance.  
While our findings are consistent with the media providing incremental information to 
outside lenders, the media may also influence private lending deals through alternative channels. 
We explore one such channel by examining the possibility that the media influences consumers’ 
perceptions of a borrower, changing their future purchasing decisions and consequently a 
borrower’s future cash flows. For example, news that a consumer-product firm acted 
irresponsibly towards the environment may cause some consumers to abandon the firm’s 
products. It is plausible that lenders would incorporate the expected impact of changes in 
consumer behavior on a borrower’s future sales and cash flows into loan pricing.8 We thus 
hypothesis that the media, operating through a consumer perception channel, impacts the interest 
spreads of consumer-product borrowers more intensively than the spreads of other borrowers. 
We indeed find that interest spreads are more sensitive to media sentiment for consumer-
product-oriented borrowers. This evidence suggests that media can affect loan pricing via at least 
two channels - by informing outside lenders with limited access to private information and by 
changing consumers’ perception of the borrower, which is in turn priced by lenders.  
                                                 
8 While there is no reason to believe that lenders’ access to private information or public information sources would 
systematically differ for consumer-product-oriented firms relative to other firms, prior literature shows that 
consumer behavior is sensitive to consumer perceptions about a firm (Fisman et al., 2006, and Lev et al., 2009). 
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While our analyses provide robust evidence consistent with the media being a direct source 
of information to lenders, we cannot fully rule out the possibility that media sentiment proxies 
for information from other sources. However, whether the media is a direct source of information 
or simply mimics information from other sources, our results contribute to the literature by 
providing substantive evidence on the role of information signal sentiment in shaping loan deals. 
The evidence that lenders’ decisions are influenced by media sentiment is consistent with the 
theory of Rajan (1992) and differentiates our analysis from prior studies that focus primarily on 
the availability of public information about a borrower without considering a role of its sentiment 
(e.g., Sufi, 2007, Ball et al., 2008, Ivashina, 2009 and Schenone, 2010). We extend the literature 
by demonstrating that critical aspects of syndicate lending, such as lead arranger choice, 
syndicate participation decisions, loan share retained by the lead arranger and loan pricing are 
significantly associated with the sentiment of business press articles, controlling for alternative 
information sources about the borrower. We also provide novel evidence consistent with media 
sentiment impacting loan pricing via its influence on consumer perceptions and behavior. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents prior research that 
motivates our analyses and the hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample and 
data. Section 4 reports our main results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Motivation and Related Literature  
2.1. Information asymmetry between lenders competing to serve as a lead arranger  
Private debt contracts rely on the flow of confidential information between lenders and 
borrowers (e.g., Diamond, 1984, and Fama 1985). Confidential information includes hard 
information, such as timely financial disclosures, covenant compliance information, amendment 
and waiver requests, financial projections, and plans for acquisitions or dispositions (Standard 
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and Poor’s, 2011), as well as softer information, such as observations about a management 
team’s abilities, honesty, and how they react under pressure (Petersen, 2004). Lenders with 
access to borrowers’ confidential information are surely less reliant on public information than 
are equity investors. However, not all lenders have equivalent access to borrowers’ private 
information, and information asymmetries across lenders create a demand from informationally 
disadvantaged lenders for public information.  
A syndicated loan is a loan issued to a firm jointly by more than one financial institution. 
Members of a syndicate can be classified as either lead arrangers or participant lenders. The lead 
arranger initiates a loan, negotiates with a borrower and then syndicates shares of the loan to 
participant lenders. Before any loan participants are invited to join a syndicate, the borrower first 
selects the lead arranger from the set of competing lenders. Information asymmetry can affect the 
competition among lenders competing for a mandate to serve as a lead arranger on a loan. Here 
we must distinguish between inside lenders with a prior relationship with a borrower and outside, 
non-relationship lenders.  
Relationship lenders interact repeatedly with borrowers over an extended time period, and 
in the process gain extensive inside knowledge of borrowers’ operations and develop private 
channels of communication with managers. Due to this information advantage, relationships are 
an important source of an incumbent bank’s comparative advantage over new lenders without a 
relationship (Boot, 2000). Thus, when lenders compete to serve as lead arranger, outside, non-
relationship lenders face adverse selection risk due to their pre-bidding information 
disadvantage. This adverse selection issue is the focus of Rajan (1992).  
Rajan models competitive dynamics in private lending markets in a setting where a 
relationship bank competes for a borrower’s loan with less informed (outside) banks. The 
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premise is that the inside bank acquires private information through privileged access to the 
borrower, while an outside bank lacks access. The model assumes that the inside bank knows for 
sure whether the firm will succeed or fail, while an outside bank has an assessed probability of 
success.9 Under these conditions, an outside bank is at a disadvantage in bidding against the 
inside lender. The outside bank understands that if it adopts an aggressive strategy of always 
bidding, the inside bank will exploit this predictability and always win good loans by offering the 
borrower slightly better terms than does the outsider in the good state (when the firm will 
succeed) and leaving outside lenders with bad loans by not bidding in the bad state (when the 
firm will fail). This exposes the outsider to a Winner’s Curse problem in which it would finance 
only bad projects.  
To deal with this problem, an outside lender plays a mixed strategy in which it randomizes 
between bidding and not bidding. This implies that with some probability the outside lender will 
not participate in the bidding process. Rajan (1992) shows that outsiders bid less frequently as 
their assessed probability that the loan is bad increases. Taking as given the outsider’s mixed 
strategy, the insider’s equilibrium strategy is to bid for good loans, but not for bad loans. For 
good loans, the insider offers higher interest rates than outsiders do, knowing that when the 
outsider does not bid they will win the loan and earn high profits, but lose the loan and earn zero 
profits if the outsider bids. In an important extension, Rajan (1992) shows that public disclosure 
influences outside lenders’ probability of bidding by changing their assessments of loan quality. 
While a more positive signal increases outside lenders’ assessments of loan quality, a more 
negative signal increases the adverse selection problem.  
                                                 
9 Hauswald and Marquez (2006) demonstrate similar economic consequences of relationship lending in a model 
where inside banks are imperfectly informed, but better informed than outside banks.  
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This leads to the result that the probability of an outsider bidding for a loan is higher for 
signals with higher sentiment.10 Further, the greater the probability of outsiders’ bidding, the 
higher is their probability of winning the loan. Building on this intuition, we hypothesize that the 
probability of an outside, non-relationship lender serving as the lead arranger of a syndicated 
loan is increasing in media sentiment. Following Schenone (2010), we classify a loan as 
syndicated by a relationship lead arranger if the lender has syndicated a majority of the 
borrower’s prior loan deals by volume over the five-year period preceding the loan issuance date, 
and syndicated by a non-relationship lender otherwise. We construct a media sentiment variable 
using the RavenPack database to proxy for the sentiment of public information signals in Rajan.  
While Rajan (1992) describes well competition among differentially informed lenders to 
win a loan deal, the model does not directly consider information asymmetry issues associated 
with loan syndicate formation. We turn to this issue next. 
2.2. Information asymmetry within loan syndicates  
We examine whether the media influences the willingness of lenders to participate as 
members in a loan syndicate.  Participant lenders generally do not directly communicate with the 
borrower and maintain an arm’s-length relationship through the lead arranger. The lead arranger 
establishes and maintains a relationship with the borrower and acts as an agent for the syndicate 
by collecting and processing information about the borrower. Prior to syndication, the lead bank 
conducts due diligence and presents an assessment of the borrower's quality to potential 
participants. Thus, participants face adverse selection risk because the lead bank may have an 
incentive to syndicate low quality loans. Lead banks may, for example, originate and then 
                                                 
10 While Rajan’s model is analyzed in terms of only a good and bad signal, it is straightforward to generalize this 
result to a setting with more than two signals. What is required is that the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property holds 
such that higher signals indicate a higher likelihood that the loan is good (Rajan’s two signal model implicitly 
assumes MLRP). In this case, higher signals result in a greater probability of bidding. In the language of our paper, 
the probability of an outsider bidding for a loan monotonically increases in the sentiment of the information signal. 
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syndicate low quality loans to capture private benefits or future cross-selling opportunities with 
the borrower (Mora, 2015). After syndication, the lead bank is charged with monitoring the 
borrower. This introduces moral hazard risk as lead banks only retain part of the loan, which 
reduces incentives to monitor.  
Both adverse selection and moral hazard expose syndicate participants to risk of 
wrongdoing by the lead bank (Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009). The vast majority of research on 
syndicate lending does not distinguish between moral hazard and adverse selection risks (e.g., 
Ball et al., 2008, Ivashina, 2009, Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000, Jones, Lang, and Nigro, 2005). 
An exception is Sufi (2007), who does provide some evidence that moral hazard is an operative 
risk in syndicates. However, Sufi does not claim that his evidence rules out a role for adverse 
selection in the syndicate. In fact, separating these two risks empirically is very challenging. As 
noted by Cohen and Siegelman (2009), the consequences of moral hazard and adverse selection 
are generally observationally equivalent, and thus very difficult to disentangle. In our paper, we 
do not attempt to distinguish the two. Rather, as we argue next, the media can influence lenders’ 
participation through either an adverse selection or moral hazard channel.  
The syndication process seeks to match borrowers with a set of lenders that value the 
loan most highly. To form a syndicate, a lead bank sends out invitations to a large set of potential 
lenders who choose whether to submit bids to join the syndicate. It is the case that invitations to 
bid generally outnumber acceptances, implying that many invitees choose not to participate 
(Champagne and Kryzanowski, 2007). Lenders that accept the invitation submit sealed bids 
directly to the lead bank. After bids are in, a minimum clearing spread is determined and investors 
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who bid that spread or below are awarded a share of the loan on a pro-rata basis (Ivashina and 
Sun, 2011).11  
Given this institutional setting, we extend the adverse selection dynamics reasoning from 
Rajan (1992) to competition among differentially informed participant lenders to become 
syndicate members. We consider as more informed inside participants those lenders who have a 
previous relationship with either the borrower or a loan’s lead arranger, and as less informed 
outside participants those without a previous relationship (e.g., Sufi, 2007, and Ivashina, 2009). 
We posit that syndicate participants with a previous relationship face less severe information 
risks than participants without a relationship. A participant’s familiarity with the lead bank or 
borrower allows them access to alternative sources of information or assurances about loan 
quality not available to participants without a relationship. Thus, the winner’s curse issue 
developed in Rajan (1992) is likely to play a role in lender syndicate participation decisions to 
the extent that inside participants pursue good loans, leaving bad loans for less informed bidders. 
In line with Rajan (1992), media can influence the severity of the winner’s curse problem, where 
more positive media signals increase the willingness of non-relationship (less informed) lenders 
to bid for loan participation. Note that outside lenders that do not join the syndicate can either not 
submit bids or submit bids that are rejected by the lead arranger in favor of superior bids by 
relationship participants.  
Further, syndicate participants also face the moral hazard risk that the lead arranger may 
shirk on supplying monitoring effort after a loan closes. While Rajan (1992) does not address 
moral hazard issues, it is plausible that media sentiment can influence bidding strategies of 
outside participants facing moral hazard by influencing their assessments of potential losses from 
                                                 
11 If the loan is under-subscribed, it can remain open for some period of time as the lead banks tries to determine 
whether the loan is over-priced or if investors with significant search costs will ultimately appear and participate at 
the given price.  See Ivashina and Sun (1011) for additional discussion of the syndication process. 
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lead arranger shirking. The idea is that the severity of potential losses due to a lack of monitoring 
effort is likely to be higher for troubled borrowers (Sufi, 2007). Negative media news can lower 
outside participants’ assessments of loan quality and so increase their concerns about the lead 
arranger shirking. This can in turn increase the information disadvantage of non-relationship 
participants relative to relationship participants possessing enhanced channels of communication 
with the borrower or lead arranger. Thus outside participants may be less willing to bid against 
relationship lenders to join a syndicate or demand terms that are less favorable than those 
demanded by relationship participants and therefore are rejected by the lead arranger. Based on 
these arguments, we hypothesize that the probability of non-relationship syndicate participants 
joining the syndicate increases in media sentiment also through the moral hazard channel. 
We further examine the effect of media on information asymmetry within syndicates by 
investigating whether media sentiment is associated with the proportion of the loan retained by 
the lead bank. Theory posits that a key mechanism for resolving information asymmetry issues 
and securing potential syndicate lenders’ willingness to join the loan syndicate is to require lead 
banks to have skin in the game by holding a stake in the loan that increases in the severity of 
agency problems (e.g., Leland and Pyle, 1977, Diamond, 1984, and Holmström and Tirole, 
1997). Empirical research provides evidence consistent with the theory. Sufi (2007) shows that 
lead banks hold a larger share of the loan when borrowers are more opaque, while Ball et al. 
(2008) show that the share retained by lead banks is decreasing in the debt contracting value of 
the borrower’s accounting numbers. We extend and innovate on this literature by conjecturing 
that the share retained by the lead arranger depends not only on the fact that there is public 
disclosure, but also on the sentiment conveyed by the disclosure. Because, as argued earlier, a 
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more positive public signal decreases adverse selection and moral hazard risk, we predict that the 
loan share retained by the lead arranger is decreasing in media sentiment.   
2.3. Media sentiment and loan pricing  
In addition to lenders’ willingness to originate or participate in a loan, we also hypothesize 
that more favorable media sentiment decreases interest rate spreads. This hypothesis is motivated 
by Rajan (1992) who shows that more positive disclosure increases the aggressiveness of outside 
lenders in bidding for a loan, which decreases the rents that inside lenders can extract from 
borrowers and thus results in lower interest rate spreads. Our hypothesis is also related to recent 
empirical research that exploits changes in a firm’s information environment to identify whether 
the information advantage of inside banks is reflected in loan pricing. Specifically, Hale and 
Santos (2009) examine how loan pricing changes following bond IPOs. They predict that when 
public information released during the IPO process reveals positive news about a borrower – that 
a borrower is creditworthy – it increases outside banks’ willingness to bid on its loans and 
consequently reduces the information advantage of inside lenders. Consistently, Hale and Santos 
(2009) find that firms revealed as having investment grade credit ratings pay lower spreads on 
their loans after they undertake a bond IPO.    
  Hale and Santos (2009) rely on a significant information event to identify the effects of 
public disclosure on reducing inside banks’ ability to extract rents from borrowers. We 
complement Hale and Santos (2009) by examining whether more favorable media sentiment 
results in lower spreads. In a syndicated loan setting, we expect more favorable media sentiment 
to increase both the aggressiveness with which outside lenders bid to arrange loans and to 
participate in loan syndicates, thus expanding the set of lenders willing to fund the loan. This 
expansion of potential lenders should increase the supply of credit available to the borrower. To 
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the extent that interest spreads are negatively associated with the supply of credit (e.g., Ivashina 
and Sun, 2011), we predict that the wider range of syndicate participants and arrangers 
associated with more positive media sentiment results in lower loan pricing.   
2.4. The role of the business press in capital markets 
The main premise of our paper is that the business press plays an important role in the 
private lending market by mitigating information asymmetries between differentially informed 
lenders. While there has been little research to date on this topic, a growing body of research 
demonstrates a substantive role played by the business press in the equity market. Although the 
information structures and contractual features of private lending differ from those of the equity 
markets, prior research supports the plausibility of our premise that the media can be informative 
to less informed outside lenders and influence their behavior.  
Miller (2006) finds that the press serves as a watchdog for accounting fraud by 
rebroadcasting information from other information intermediaries and by undertaking original 
investigations that provide new information to the markets. Several papers find that media 
articles pressure firms to alter governance structures and strategic decisions. Dyck and Zingales 
(2002) show that the media affects firms’ environmental policies and the amount of corporate 
resources diverted to the advantage of controlling shareholders, while Bednar et al. (2012) show 
that negative media coverage prompts firms to change their resource allocations. Kuhnen and 
Niessen (2012) find that following negative press coverage of CEO pay, firms reduce option 
grants and increase less contentious types of compensation, such as salary. Joe et al. (2009) find 
that media exposure about board ineffectiveness pressures firms to take corrective actions. For 
lenders without privileged access to a borrower, media articles that reveal fraud or pressure firms 
to alter governance and strategic choices can plausibly convey new information about the 
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integrity of a borrower’s executives, litigation risk or changes in managerial incentives. These 
are important aspects of lenders’ assessments of a borrower’s future prospects and 
creditworthiness.   
Further, there is evidence that the business press provides information about firm 
fundamentals to equity market participants over and above that provided by other information 
intermediaries and accounting data.12 Bushee et al. (2010) demonstrate that the press reduces 
information asymmetry in the equity market, incremental to firm-initiated disclosure and 
disclosures by equity analysts. Fang and Peress (2009) show that stocks with no media coverage 
earn higher future returns than do stocks with high media coverage. Tetlock et al. (2008) finds 
that the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories forecasts low firm earnings and 
that equity prices quickly respond to the information in negative words. They suggest that 
linguistic media sentiment captures otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of firms’ fundamentals. 
Further, using textual analysis to distinguish press articles that reflect relevant news from those 
that do not, Boudoukh et al. (2012) find a strong relation between news and stock price 
changes.13 Overall, this literature provides evidence that the media informs equity market 
participants by providing information on hard-to-quantify aspects of firms’ fundamentals.14  
It is thus plausible that the media can also impact private lending markets by providing 
information on hard-to-quantify aspects of firms’ fundamentals underpinning credit quality. 
Lenders’ assessments of firms’ credit risk can be affected by information about products, 
                                                 
12 Engelberg and Parsons (2011) establish the causal impact of the media in financial markets by comparing the 
behaviors of investors with access to different media coverage of the same information event. For all earnings 
announcements of S&P 500 Index firms, they find that local media coverage strongly predicts local trading, after 
controlling for earnings, investor, and newspaper characteristics (see also Dougal et al. (2012) on causal relations). 
13 In contrast to the result in Roll (1988) showing little relation between stock prices and news, Boudoukh et al. 
(2012) find that market model (four-factor model) R-squares are significantly lower on news versus no news days.  
14 See also Kothari et al. (2009) and Rogers et al. (2013). In contrast, a number of recent papers suggest that media 
coverage might exacerbate information asymmetry and inefficient trading behavior (e.g., Frankel and Li, 2004, 
Green et al., 2012, and Soltes et al., 2013).  
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competitors, customers, industry growth potential, top executive teams, governance, strategic 
plans, acquisitions, labor markets, regulation and legal issues, among many other topics (Green 
et al., 2012). The information revealed by the media may be new information not available to 
lenders from other sources, or it could be a signal that confirms, corroborates or substantiates 
noisy information that lenders received from a different source. In this later case, the media 
could, for example, confirm soft information the lender obtained about the borrower elsewhere, 
or allow the lender to filter noise from signals received from other sources. While our research 
design does not allow us to distinguish the specific topics covered in the media articles 
underpinning our media sentiment measure, extant research shows the power of a computational 
linguistics approach to quantify the language of a wide swath of firms’ media coverage rather 
than focusing on specific categories of news. As noted by Tetlock et al. (2008), by quantifying 
language, researchers can examine the directional impact of a wide variety of events, rather than 
focusing on particular event types. 
In addition to providing direct information to lenders about a borrower’s circumstances, 
media can indirectly influence private lending deals by changing a borrower’s circumstances 
through its impact on the behavior of a borrower’s stakeholders. We explore one such channel by 
examining the possibility that the media influences consumers’ perceptions of a borrower, 
changing their future purchasing decisions and consequently a borrower’s future cash flows. The 
idea is that lenders would incorporate the expected consequences of these changes into the loan 
terms offered to the borrower. 
3. Sample, Data and Descriptive Statistics  
3.1. Data sources and sample selection 
We employ the DealScan database provided by the Thomson Reuters Loan Pricing 
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Corporation (TRLPC) to obtain loan-specific characteristics. Media sentiment scores are from 
RavenPack News Analytics, which covers all news disseminated via Dow Jones Newswires. 
RavenPack employs a variety of advanced textual analysis techniques to create news sentiment 
scores for business news stories. We obtain firm characteristics from Compustat. Firms’ senior 
debt ratings, watchlist and outlook data (at the firm level) are retrieved from the S&P historical 
database. For borrowers with no rating data in the S&P database, we collect the S&P, Moody’s 
and Fitch ratings from the Internet-based version of TRLPC. 
Table 1 summarizes the sample selection process. For the period from 2000 to 2012, 
DealScan reports 31,974 facilities issued to U.S. public firms in U.S. dollars. This time period 
reflects the availability of media data from RavenPack. Merging this sample with RavenPack 
leaves us with 24,308 facilities. Next, we exclude facilities with insufficient loan data, reducing 
the sample to 12,397 facilities. We also require borrowers to have sufficient Compustat data to 
estimate borrower characteristics and sufficient RavenPack data to estimate media sentiment 
prior to loan issuance. We estimate borrower characteristics in the quarter prior to the loan 
issuance and media sentiment over the 180 days prior to the loan issuance.15 We limit media data 
to full-size articles, excluding news flashes (news articles composed only of a headline and no 
body text), news articles composed of a headline and mostly tabular data and firm-initiated press 
releases. We further restrict our sample to full-size articles with a relevance score of 75 and 
above. The relevance score is assigned by RavenPack to indicate when the firm is strongly 
related to the underlying news story. The scores range from 0 (low relevance) to 100 (high 
relevance). Our final sample contains 7,244 facilities related to 2,031 firms.  
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
15 We focus on the 180 days prior to the loan issuance to allow a sufficient time period prior to the start of the 
syndication process, which typically takes around 3 months. Our findings and inferences do not change if we 
estimate media coverage over 90 or 60 days prior to the loan issuance.  
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables used in our tests (all variables 
are described in detail in Appendix A). Media Sentiment is estimated as the average news 
sentiment over the 180 days prior to a loan’s origination date. We utilize RavenPack’s 
Composite Sentiment Score (CSS), which represents the news sentiment of a given story by 
combining various textual analysis techniques.16 CSS scores range between 0 to 100, with a 
score above 50 indicating positive news; a score equal to 50, neutral news; and a score below 50, 
negative news. We apply a linear transformation to the CSS score and define Media Sentiment = 
(CSS-50)/50, so that the Media Sentiment ranges from -1 to 1, with zero being equivalent to 
neutral sentiment. The mean (median) value of Media Sentiment is -0.0046 (0.0000), suggesting 
that sentiment is typically neutral over the 180 days prior to a loan announcement.  
We examine five primary loan characteristics. Our first measure reflects the previous 
relationship of the lead arranger and a borrower. The mean value of Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
indicates that 63.8% of loans are issued by non-relationship lead arrangers. The next two 
measures are concerned with previous relationships of syndicate participants. The mean value of 
Part-Borr No-Relationship indicates that 56.75% of syndicate participants have not participated 
in a borrower’s syndicated loans in the five years preceding a loan’s issuance. The mean value of 
Part-Lead No-Relationship indicates that 15.25% of syndicate participants have not participated 
in syndicates arranged by the loan’s lead arranger in the five years preceding the loan’s issuance. 
We also examine the proportion of a loan retained by the lead arranger. For loans with sufficient 
data, the mean (median) value of Lead Share is 21.05% (13.38%). With respect to loan pricing, 
the average interest rate spread is 159.5 basis points (Spread is the logarithm of the interest 
spread). 
                                                 
16 See the Appendix A for a more detailed description of RavenPack’s CSS measure. 
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With respect to sample firm characteristics, the average ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items to total assets (ROA) is 0.85%. Sample firms have an average interest 
coverage ratio (Interest coverage) of 10.51, and an average Leverage, measured as the ratio of 
total liabilities to total assets, of 0.25. The firms in our sample are relatively large, with a mean 
value of total assets of $1,411M (Size is measured by the logarithm of the total assets). An 
average Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy score (Z-score) is 2.24 (a higher score indicates a lower 
credit risk). The average market-to-book ratio is 3.01. 14.76% of the sample observations relate 
to the borrowers experiencing losses.  
We report statistics for loan characteristics that serve as controls. Sample loans have an 
average size of $167.0M (Amount is the logarithm of loan amount) and a maturity (Maturity) of 
47.9 months. The majority of the loans are revolvers (62.3 percent) and 10 percent are term loans 
B and below, which are typically issued to non-bank institutional investors. 71.4 percent of the 
sample loans have performance pricing provisions (PP), 63.9 percent are secured (Collateral) 
and loans have on average 2.3 financial covenants (#Covenants).  
Finally, we provide statistics for three alternative sources of information about borrowers. 
First, we estimate the sentiment of all borrower-initiated press releases over the 180 days prior to 
a loan’s origination date. To isolate firm-initiated press releases, we impose a more stringent 
relevance criterion than the one applied to media articles and require a relevance score of 90 or 
greater. Press releases with a relevance score above 75 and below 90 often relate to cases where 
the firm is mentioned in the press releases of other firms. We apply a linear transformation to the 
CSS score and define Press Release Sentiment = (CSS-50)/50, so that Press Release Sentiment 
ranges from -1 to 1, with zero being equivalent to neutral sentiment. The press release sentiment 
is typically positive, with a mean (median) value of Press Release Sentiment of 0.0243 (0.0264). 
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Second, we report on whether the borrower is rated by a credit rating agency. 56% of sample 
loans are issued to rated borrowers. Third, because prior research suggests that equity analysts 
are informative to lenders (e.g., Guntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010), we 
measure whether a borrower has equity analyst coverage at loan origination. 87.5% of sample 
loans are issued to borrowers with analyst coverage. 
To reflect additional information available about a borrower, we also estimate a borrower’s 
abnormal stock returns over the same period during which media sentiment is measured. Sample 
borrowers experience mean (median) abnormal returns of 5.6% (2.2%) over the 180 days prior to 
a loan’s issuance (Return), with 42.75% of borrowers having a negative return over this period 
(Negative Return). 
4. Empirical Results 
We organize the discussion of our empirical findings into four subsections. Section 4.1 
provides evidence on the association between media sentiment and the probability of a non-
relationship bank leading the loan deal. Section 4.2 examines the relations between media 
sentiment and syndicate structure and section 4.3 between media sentiment and loan pricing. In 
section 4.4 we provide evidence consistent with the media being a direct source of information to 
less informed, outside lenders. Finally, in section 4.5 we examine an additional channel through 
witch media may affect loan pricing.  
4.1. Media sentiment and the probability of a non-relationship bank leading the loan deal 
In this section we examine whether media sentiment is positively associated with the 
probability of outside, non-relationship lenders serving as a lead arranger. Rajan (1992) theorizes 
that as public disclosure sentiment increases, outsider lenders will bid more aggressively for a 
loan, thereby increasing their probability of winning the loan. Extending this idea to competing 
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lead arrangers in the syndicated loan market, we predict that a more positive media sentiment is 
associated with a higher probability that a lender without an established relationship with the 
borrower originates the loan. We estimate the following logistic model: 
        0 1 2
3 ,
Borr-Lead No-Relationship= Media Sentiment Controls
Alternative Info Sources
  

 
            (1) 
where Borr-Lead No-Relationship is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan is issued by a non-
relationship lender, and zero otherwise.17 Media Sentiment is our main variable of interest; we 
predict that 1 > 0.  
We control for a number of factors that prior research suggests are associated with the 
probability of non-relationship lead arranger syndicating the loan (e.g., Gopalan et al., 2011, and 
Bolton et al., 2013). We control for whether a firm’s previous loan is still outstanding when the 
current loan is issued (Outstanding), the time between the current and previous loan (Time 
Between) and the tightness of the credit supply in the economy (Tight Credit Supply). We proxy 
for credit supply tightness using changes in bank lending standards for mid-sized and large 
commercial loans as reported in the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices (e.g., Bassett et al. 2012). The Tight Credit Supply 
variable takes a value of 1 if the change in lending standards in the quarter of a loan’s origination 
is in the top quartile of the sample’s distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
We also control for borrower characteristics reflecting its creditworthiness, including 
profitability (ROA), interest coverage ratio (Interest Coverage), leverage (Leverage), size of total 
assets (Size), z-score (Z-score), the market-to-book ratio (MTB) and an indicator variable 
reflecting whether the borrower has experienced losses (Loss). In terms of loan-specific 
                                                 
17 To be able to measure this relationship variable, we restrict the estimation of model (2) to the sample of 
borrowers who issued at least one loan over the five-year period prior to a current loan’s origination date. 
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characteristics, we control for loan size (Amount), maturity (Maturity), whether the loan is a 
revolving line of credit (Revolver) and if the loan is a term loan B and below (Term Loan B). 
Finally, we control for alternative information sources about the borrower, including its 
press release sentiment (Press Release Sentiment), whether it is rated (Rated) and whether it has 
analysts’ coverage (Analyst Coverage).18 To reflect borrower-related news not captured by 
additional information sources and firm controls, we also include a borrower’s abnormal stock 
returns (Return) and an indicator variable reflecting whether stock returns are negative (Negative 
Return), measured contemporaneously with Media Sentiment. Although stock returns impound 
all available information, there is still scope for Media Sentiment to play an independent role in 
informing lenders. The idea here is that the weights placed on available information signals are 
tailored to the specific decision context at hand. Our paper focuses on lenders’ use of media 
articles to assess credit quality and overcome information asymmetry. While stock prices imbed 
valuation weights on information signals that are optimal for purposes of valuing equity, it is 
plausible that lenders assessing credit quality would generally weigh these same signals 
differently. Thus, the separate media variable can play an important role in allowing lenders to 
optimally balance weights across information signals for credit evaluation purposes (Paul, 1992, 
Bushman and Indjejikian, 1993).19 Finally, we cluster the standard errors at the firm and calendar 
                                                 
18 In section 4.4 we include additional measures of alternative information sources in the specification. 
19 Consider a simple example. Assume that equity investors’ information set consist of two signals, X1 (e.g., media 
sentiment) and X2 (another signal). This information gets impounded into price via trading activity resulting in 
equilibrium price. For valuation purposes, equilibrium price applies equal weights to the signals giving: Price = 
X1+X2. Assume that for credit purposes, a lender would optimally weight the signals as: Credit quality = 1X1 + 
2X2. The lender cannot observe X1 and X2 separately, but instead observes X1 and stock price. How would lenders 
use these signals? Given that they want to optimally weight the signals for credit purposes, they would construct the 
following estimate of credit quality:  Credit Quality = 1X1 + 2*(Price – X1) = 1X1 + 2X2. That is, even though 
price fully impounds X1 (e.g., media sentiment), lenders find it optimal to use X1 in addition to price in order to 
achieve the desired weights on X1 and X2. 
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quarter levels (this applies to all the remaining analyses).20 
We present our findings Table 3. Consistent with the theory of Rajan (1992), we find that 
the coefficient on Media Sentiment is positive and significant, suggesting that the probability of a 
non-relationship lead arranger syndicating the loan is increasing in media sentiment. A one 
standard deviation increase in media sentiment increases the probability that a loan is syndicated 
by a non-relationship lead arranger by 6.2%.  
With respect to control variables, similar to Gopalan et al. (2011), we find that the 
probability of a non-relationship lender syndicating the loan decreases when the borrower’s 
previous loan is still outstanding when the current loan is issued (Outstanding), but increases 
when the time span between the current and the previous loan increases (Time-Between). We do 
not find that the tightness of the credit supply significantly affects the probability of a non-
relationship lead arranger originating the loan.21 The probability of a non-relationship lender 
syndicating the loan is also affected by a borrower’s interest coverage, size, Z-score and market-
to-book ratio. When borrowers issue larger loans or loans with a longer maturity, we find that it 
is less likely that these loans are arranged by non-relationship lenders. These results suggest that 
because non-relationship lenders have inferior access to a borrower’s private information relative 
to relationship lenders, they are less willing to syndicate larger and longer term credit. 
We find a negative coefficient on Press Release Sentiment. While this negative sign may 
be surprising, it is important to note that press releases are fundamentally different from press 
articles. Specifically, press releases are an aspect of firms’ strategic disclosure decisions, where 
                                                 
20 In light of Greene’s (2004) criticism of the inclusion of fixed effects in non-linear models, we do not incorporate 
year and industry and loan purpose fixed effects into the model. The same applies to the probability of non-
relationship lender syndicate participation model.  
21 The effect of Media Sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship lead arranger syndicating the loans is 
robust to incorporating alternative measures of the tightness of the supply of credit, such as an indicator variable 
taking the value of one if the percentage of banks tightening standards for loans to large and middle-market firms is 
above the sample median (instead of the top quartile-based measure used in the primary analyses) and the syndicated 
loan volume in the quarter of a loan’s issuance.  
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in contrast media articles are independent of a firm’s disclosure strategy (note that the sentiment 
of press releases for our sample firms is typically positive). For example, firms may issue 
positive press releases when they are trying to counter negative events or to run-up stock prices 
around mergers (e.g., Davis and Tama-Sweet, 2012, and Ahern and Sosyura, 2014). Most 
important for our purposes is that our Media Sentimnet result is robust to including press release 
sentiment, ruling out the possibility that media sentiment simply echoes firm press releases. We 
also find a negative coefficient on Analyst Coverage; this result is in line with Gopalan et al. 
(2011).  
4.2. The effect of media sentiment on syndicate participation and lead arranger share 
We next investigate the relation between media sentiment and syndicate participation. As 
discussed previously, higher media sentiment is expected to reduce less-informed lenders’ risk of 
funding a bad loan and to mitigate their concerns about lead arrangers shirking on monitoring 
effort. We predict that the likelihood of less informed lenders with no previous relationship with 
the borrower or the lead arranger participating in a syndicate is increasing in media sentiment. 
We follow Sufi (2007) and estimate the following logit model at the syndicate participant level: 
 0 1 2 3 ,Participation Media Sentiment Controls Alternative Info Sources             (1) 
where Participation is one of two participant relationship variables. Part-Borr No-Relationship 
is an indicator variable set equal to one if the participant has not participated in a borrower’s 
loans in the five years prior to a loan’s issuance date, and zero otherwise. Part-Lead No 
Relationship is an indicator variable set equal to one if the participant has not participated in a 
syndicate arranged by the loan’s lead arranger in the five years preceding the loan’s issuance, 
and zero otherwise. Media Sentiment is our main variable of interest, where we predict 1 > 0. 
In line with model 1, we control for borrower characteristics reflecting its creditworthiness. 
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We also extend the set of loan-specific controls. We add controls for a borrower’s previous 
relationship with the lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship) and for whether this is the first 
deal syndicated by the lead arranger (First Time Lead), as both may affect the attractiveness of 
the loan deal to syndicate participants. We also control for whether the loan is secured 
(Collateral), the existence of performance pricing provisions (PP) and the number of covenants 
(#Covenants).22 Similar to Model 1, we control for alternative information sources about the 
borrower and its stock returns. 
We present our findings in Table 4. In column 1 we report the estimation of model (1) with 
Part-Borr No-Relationship as the dependent variable. Consistent with our predictions, the 
coefficient on Media Sentiment is positive and significant, indicating that the probability of a 
participant with no relationship with the borrower joining the syndicate increases with media 
sentiment. This result is also economically significant: a one standard deviation increase in 
Media Sentiment increases this probability by 7.1%.  
With respect to controls, in line with lower information asymmetry between the lead 
arranger and syndicate participants when a borrower is more creditworthy, we find positive 
coefficients on ROA, Interest Coverage and Z-Score and negative coefficient on Leverage. We 
also find a positive coefficient on Borr-Lead No-Relationship, which suggests that the 
probability of non-relationship participants joining the syndicate increases when a new lead 
arranger without previous relationship with the borrower arranges the loan. The coefficient on 
Press Release Sentiment is insignificant, suggesting that while media sentiment influences less 
informed participants, the content of firm-initiated press releases does not incrementally affect 
the likelihood of their participation. When a borrower is rated, the probability of a non-
                                                 
22 We do not control for these three additional loan characteristics in Model 1, because they are typically determined 
during the negotiation process between a lead arranger and the borrower and therefore cannot affect the choice of 
the lender. In any case, in untabulated analyses, we find that our results are robust to the inclusion of these variables.  
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relationship participant joining the syndicate is significantly higher, consistent with their higher 
confidence in a loan’s quality when creditworthiness is assessed by an independent third party 
(e.g., Sufi, 2007). Note that the coefficients on Return and Negative Return are difficult to 
interpret. Stock returns consist of two components: changes in cash flow news and changes in 
discount rates (e.g., Vuolteenaho, 2002). Stock return controls therefore reflect both news about 
the borrower’s performance and discount rate news associated with a borrower’s riskiness.23  
In column 2, we report the results from the estimation of model (1) with Part-Lead No- 
Relationship as the dependent variable and find similar results. The coefficient on Media 
Sentiment is positive and significant, suggesting that the probability of a participant without a 
previous relationship with the lead arranger joining the syndicate increases with media 
sentiment. A one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases this probability by 
9.3%. The coefficients on control variables are generally consistent with those in column 1.  
Our results so far indicate that more positive media sentiment extends the range of 
participants willing to join the syndicate to those without a relationship with the borrower or the 
lead arranger. Column 3 focuses on the loan share retained by the lead arranger (Lead Share). 
Because more positive media sentiment is expected to increase syndicate participants’ 
assessment of loan quality and thus decrease adverse selection and moral hazard risk, we predict 
that the share of a loan retained by the lead arranger is decreasing in media sentiment as 
participants require the lead to have less skin in the game.  
We estimate model (1) as an OLS specification with Lead Share as the dependent variable. 
This specification also includes loan purpose, industry and year fixed effects. In line with our 
expectations, we find a negative and significant coefficient on Media Sentiment. Economically, a 
                                                 
23 Our findings do not change when we control for return volatility.  
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one standard deviation increase in media sentiment decreases the loan proportion held by the 
lead arranger by 5.3%. This evidence further supports a significant effect of media sentiment on 
syndicate structure and suggests that it operates via both channels – syndicate participants’ 
willingness to join the syndicate and the loan share the lead arranger is required to retain.  
With respect to control variables, a lead arranger retains a smaller proportion of the loan 
when the borrower is larger and more profitable. Consistent with lower agency problems within 
the syndicate when a borrower is more transparent (e.g., Sufi, 2007), the lead arranger retains a 
smaller proportion of the loan when a borrower is rated and has analyst coverage. We also find 
that a non-relationship lead arranger and the first time lead arranger hold a higher loan share, 
suggesting that participants require a lead arranger to have higher skin in the game in these cases.  
4.3. The effect of media sentiment on loan pricing  
Our analyses show that the decisions of less informed lenders to arrange and participate in 
syndicated loans are sensitive to media sentiment, where loan attractiveness is increasing in 
media sentiment. While it is important to show connections between media sentiment and 
lenders’ decisions, our results thus far do not quantify the implications of media sentiment from 
the perspective of a borrower seeking financing. We examine this issue in this section.  
As shown in Rajan (1992), more favorable public information signals can directly impact 
interest spreads by increasing outside, non-relationship lenders’ aggressiveness in bidding for a 
loan, which results in a reduction in the rents that more informed inside lenders can extract from 
borrowers. Consistently, Hale and Santos (2009) find that the reduction in the information 
advantage of inside banks following a borrower’s bond IPOs is reflected in lower loan pricing 
for borrowers identified as more creditworthy at the time of the IPO. We build on this evidence 
and examine the effect of more positive media signals about a borrower on interest spreads in a 
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syndicated loan setting, where, as we show in our previous analyses, higher media sentiment not 
only increases the non-relationship lead arrangers’ aggressiveness in bidding for a loan, but also 
attracts less informed syndicate participants to join the syndicate. This expanded set of outside 
lenders is likely to increases the supply of financing available to fund the borrower’s loan, 
exerting significant downward pressure on the interest rate spread.  
To examine this hypothesis, we estimate the following OLS model:  
  0 1 2 3 ,Interest Spread= Media Sentiment Controls Alternative Info Sources             (3) 
where Spread is the logarithm of the interest rate spread in basis points above LIBOR. We 
predict a negative coefficient on our main variable of interest - Media Sentiment. Variables 
reflecting controls and other information sources about the borrower are defined as previously. 
Further, the model includes loan purpose, industry and year fixed effects.   
We present our findings in Table 5. Consistent with our predictions, we find that the 
interest spread is inversely associated with media sentiment, with more positive sentiment 
reducing the interest spread. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase 
in Media Sentiment translates into a 6.9 basis point decrease in spread. While this effect seems 
relatively modest, it is similar to the effect of a one standard deviation change in key credit risk 
measures, such as ROA (5.5 basis points) and Leverage (12.7 basis points).  
With respect to controls, as expected, we report a negative relation between the spread and 
a borrower’s profitability, size, Z-Score, and market-to-book ratios, and a positive relation 
between the spread and leverage and an indicator variable reflecting losses. The coefficients on 
loan-level controls are generally consistent with prior research. Larger loans and loans with 
performance pricing provisions are associated with lower spreads (Booth, 1992, and Asquith et 
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al., 2005).24 Due to the endogenous determination of contractual terms, we observe a positive 
relation between the interest spread and both Collateral and #Covenants (Berger and Udell, 
1990, Bradley and Roberts, 2004, and Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011).25 While 
concurrently endogenizing all loan terms is beyond the scope of our paper, in untabulated 
analyses we estimate the interest rate model excluding loan controls; our findings are unchanged. 
We find that revolvers (Term Loans B and below) are priced at lower (higher) rates, consistent 
with prior research (Harjoto et al., 2004, Zhang, 2008, Nandy and Shao, 2010, and Lim et al., 
2014). We also show that more positive press release sentiment and analyst coverage are 
negatively associated with the spread.   
The results presented in Tables 4-6 are consistent with the media providing incremental 
information to less informed, non-relationship lenders. To further support our claim that these 
lenders learn directly from the media, in the next section we provide additional analyses that 
address alternative information sources available for lenders in more detail. 
4.4 Is the media a direct source of information to less informed, outside lenders? 
4.4.1 The effect of media sentiment, controlling for alternative public information sources 
In Table 3, 4 and 5 we control for variables that reflect three alternative sources of 
information available to lenders: firm-initiated press releases, equity analysts and rating 
agencies. We also incorporate stock return related variables. To further identify whether non-
relationship lenders learn from the media, we extend the analysis by including in models (1), (2) 
and (3) a large vector of additional information controls.  
                                                 
24 We do not find a significant relation between the spread and maturity. A longer maturity is typically associated 
with more uncertainty, but lenders may be willing to issue longer term loans to more creditworthy borrowers. 
25 Agency theory suggests that there is a trade-off between the restrictions imposed by the loan contract and the 
interest spread (Jensen and Meckling, 1979, Myers, 1977, and Smith and Warner, 1979). However, because more 
risky borrowers are likely to have higher spreads and lenders may simultaneously impose a higher number of 
covenants and/or require them to provide collateral, empirical tests typically reveal a positive relation between these 
variables.  
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First, we add controls for the number of media articles (#Articles) and firm-initiated press 
releases (#Press Releases) over the 180 day period prior to loan issuance. With respect to rating 
agencies, we control for the level of credit rating (Credit Rating) at a loan’s issuance date, the 
change in credit rating over the 180 day period prior to issuance (ΔCredit Rating); whether the 
borrower is on a credit watchlist at the time of issuance (Current Watch) or over the 180 days 
prior to the issuance (Prior 180 Watch); and a borrower’s long-term credit outlook at loan 
issuance (Current Outlook) and over the 180 days prior to the issuance (Prior 180 Outlook). 
With respect to equity analysts, we control for analysts’ earnings forecasts (Analyst Forecast) 
and recommendations (Analyst Recommendation) at the time of a loan’s issuance, and the 
forecast revisions (Forecast Revision) and recommendation revision (Recommendation Revision) 
over the 180 days prior to the issuance.  
The results are reported in Table 6. In column 1, we find that the effect of media sentiment 
on the probability that a non-relationship lead arranger syndicates the loan continues to be 
statistically and economically significant after incorporating this wide set of additional 
information controls. One standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases this 
probability by 11.0%. As we report in columns 2 and 3, we continue to find a positive coefficient 
on Media Sentiment in both the Part-Borr No-Relationship and Part-Lead No-Relationship 
specifications respectively, although at a lower level of statistical significance. A one standard 
deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases the probability that a participant without a prior 
relationship with the borrower (lead arranger) joins the syndicate by 4.7% (8.7%). The relation 
between Media Sentiment and Lead Share is also robust to additional information controls. The 
coefficient on Media Sentiment is negative and significant in column 4. A one standard deviation 
increase in media sentiment decreases the loan share retained by the lead arranger by 5.0%. 
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Finally, for loan pricing analyses presented in column 5, we find that the coefficient on Media 
Sentiment continues to be negative and significant. A one standard deviation increase in Media 
Sentiment decreases the interest spread by 4.2 basis points. 
The evidence in Table 6 suggests that it is unlikely that the effect of media sentiment on the 
probability of an outside lead arranger syndicating a loan, syndicate structure and loan pricing 
are explained by the media rebroadcasting information provided by other information sources. 
4.4.2 The effect of media sentiment, conditional on the intensity of analyst coverage 
To provide further evidence that media is a direct source of information to lenders, we 
conduct analyses conditional on the intensity of a borrower’s analysts’ coverage. We conjecture 
that if media sentiment is informative to less informed lenders, its effect on syndicate structure 
will be stronger when a borrower’s coverage by other information intermediaries is less 
intensive. This prediction is motivated by prior evidence that analysts are an important 
information source to lenders (e.g., Guntay and Hackbarth, 2010, and Mansi et al., 2010). 
Therefore, outside lenders will rely more on alternative information sources, such as the media, 
when analyst following is relatively low. The general idea is that investors’ posterior 
expectations will respond more intensively to an information signal of a given precision as prior 
uncertainty about a firm’s prospects increases (e.g., Verrecchia, 2001). We classify borrowers as 
having highly intensive analyst coverage if the number of analysts covering the firm falls into the 
top quintile of the sample distribution, and as less intensive otherwise. We then estimate models 
(1), (2) and (3) for the two sub-samples – borrowers with highly intensive and less intensive 
coverage.26 We report these tests in Table 7.  
As we report in Table 7, Panel A, for the lead arranger analyses, the coefficient on Media 
                                                 
26 Our results are robust when we define borrowers as having highly intensive analyst coverage if the number of 
analysts covering the firm falls into the top quartile of the sample distribution (the same relates to the non-
relationship lead arranger and the interest rate spread analyses).  
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Sentiment is positive and significant for the less intensive analyst coverage partition, but that it is 
not significant for the highly intensive coverage partition, although the difference in the 
coefficients between the two partitions is not significant. Economically, for the less intensive 
analysts’ coverage partition, a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases the 
probability that a lender without a prior relationship with the borrower arranges the loan by 
7.6%. 
We find that for both the Part-Borr No-Relationship and Part-Lead No-Relationship 
specifications the coefficient on Media Sentiment is negative and significant for the less intensive 
analyst coverage partition, but it is not significant for the highly intensive coverage partition 
(Table 7, Panels B and C). The difference in coefficients on Media Sentiment between these 
partitions is also statistically significant. Economically, for the less intensive analysts’ coverage 
sub-sample, one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment increases the probability that a 
syndicate participant without a prior relationship with the borrower (lead arranger) joins the 
syndicate by 12.1% (12.1%). The results are similar when we examine the lead bank’s loan share 
aspect of the syndicate structure (Table 7, Panel D). The effect of media sentiment is significant 
for borrowers with less intensive analyst coverage, but not for those with highly intensive 
coverage. The difference in coefficients on Media Sentiment between the two partitions is 
significant at the 10% level. For borrowers with less intensive analyst coverage, a one standard 
deviation increase in Media Sentiment decreases the proportion held by the lead arranger by 
4.6%.  
Based on our findings that the effect of media sentiment on the willingness of less informed 
lead arrangers and syndicate participants to fund a loan is stronger when the equity analysts’ 
coverage is less intensive, we also predict that the effect of media sentiment on the interest 
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spread will be stronger for the less intensive analyst coverage partition. In Table 7, Panel E, we 
report that the coefficient on Media Sentiment is negative and significant for the less intensive 
coverage partition, but not significant for the highly intensive partition. The difference in 
coefficients on Media Sentiment between these partitions is statistically significant. For the less 
intensive analysts’ coverage sub-sample, a one standard deviation increase in Media Sentiment 
translates into a 7.3 basis points decrease in the interest spread. 
The results presented in Table 7, Panels A-E are in line with the media providing more 
informative public signals to syndicate participants when information production by other 
information intermediaries is less intensive. However, firms with intensive analyst coverage can 
potentially differ from firms with less intensive coverage across a number of dimensions. We 
therefore examine how the effect of media sentiment differs across borrowers that have 
experienced a reduction in analysts’ coverage prior to loan initiation and those that have not. A 
reduction in analyst coverage has been shown to be associated with an exogenous (unrelated to 
changes in firm fundamentals) decrease in public information production about the firm (e.g., 
Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012, and Balakrishnan et al., 2013). We hypothesize that media signals 
will provide be more informative to non-relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants 
following coverage reductions. We report these analyses in Table 8.  
We identify that 4.3% of observations in the lead arranger analyses, 6.3% in the syndicate 
participant analyses, 4.2% in the lender share analyses and 4.5% in the loan spread analysis 
relate to borrowers that have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage over the year preceding 
loan issuance.27 Despite the small sample size, in table 8, Panel A we find a significantly higher 
coefficient on Media Sentiment (at the 10% level) for this partition. We also find that the 
                                                 
27 When we measure analyst coverage reduction over the 180 day period prior to the loan issuance, the proportion of 
borrowers that have experienced a reduction in analyst coverage becomes even smaller, preventing us from 
conducting empirical analyses.   
 
 
36
coefficient on Media Sentiment is significantly higher at 10% level for analyst reduction partition 
for the Part-Borr No-Relationship specification (Table 8, Panel B).  For the Lead Share analyses 
(Table 8, Panel D), the coefficient on Media Sentiment for the analyst coverage reduction 
partition is higher than the respective coefficient for the no coverage reduction partition, but the 
difference is not statistically significant. Finally, in Table 8, Panel E, we compare the effect of 
media coverage on loan pricing across borrowers that have experienced a reduction in the analyst 
coverage prior to the loan issuance and those that have not. The coefficient on Media Coverage 
is significantly larger for the analyst coverage reduction partition, further suggesting that media 
sentiment is more informative to lenders when information production by other information 
sources becomes less intensive.  
Overall, the stronger effects of media sentiment on the likelihood of non-relationship lead 
arranger, syndicate structure and loan pricing for less intensive analyst coverage and reduction in 
analyst coverage partitions reinforce our inference that media serves as a direct source of 
information to less informed, outside lenders.  
4.5 The sensitivity of interest spreads to media sentiment for consumer product firms 
Results in Tables 3-8 suggest that the media influences loan pricing by providing 
incremental information to outside lenders, which increases the supply of credit by attracting 
non-relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants. In this section, we explore one 
additional channel through which media may affect interest spreads by examining the possibility 
that media influences consumers’ perceptions of a borrower, changing their future purchasing 
decisions and consequently a borrower’s future cash flows. 
Specifically, we examine whether spreads are more sensitive to media sentiment for 
consumer-product-oriented firms. Consumers’ decisions to purchase a firm’s products are 
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potentially influenced by positive or negative news about the firm. Previous literature provides 
evidence that consumer behavior is sensitive to perceptions of a firm. For example, Lev et al. 
(2009) find that charitable contributions are significantly positively associated with future 
revenue, particularly for consumer-product-oriented firms. Similarly, Fisman et al. (2006) find 
that corporate philanthropy and profits are positively related, but only for firms in industries 
where a firm’s image is important to consumers. We posit that more positive media sentiment 
improves consumers’ perceptions of a borrower, potentially increasing its future sales and cash 
flows. Because lenders are likely to incorporate a borrower’s consumer behavior into loan 
pricing, we predict that the effect of media sentiment on loan pricing is more pronounced for 
more consumer-product oriented firms.  
Following Fisman et al. (2006), we identify whether a borrower is consumer product 
oriented by the relative importance of its advertising expenses. We classify borrowers as having 
high consumer product intensity if the ratio of advertising expenses to sales revenue is above the 
sample median. We estimate the interest rate model for consumer product intensity partitions and 
report our findings in Table 9. We find that although the coefficient on Media Sentiment is 
negative and significant for both partitions, it is significantly larger for the high consumer 
product intensity partition relative to the low intensity partition. The difference in the coefficients 
across the two partitions is statistically significant. A higher sensitivity of interest rate spreads to 
media sentiment for more consumer-product-oriented firms is consistent with lenders accounting 
for the impact of media news on a borrower’s future sales. In untabulated analyses, we include 
the additional controls for alternative information sources described earlier in Section 4.4.1. We 
continue to find that similar results.  
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Overall, our interest spread analyses suggests that media sentiment affects loan pricing both 
by informing less informed outside lenders and by changing consumers’ perception of the 
borrower, the implications of which are priced by lenders.  
5. Summary 
This paper examines whether media coverage influences syndicated loan origination and 
participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures and 
interest spreads. We first investigate if media influences competition between inside and outside 
lenders to serve as lead arranger on a borrower’s loan. This analysis builds on Rajan (1992) who 
shows that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases 
in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extrapolate this economic 
reasoning to syndicated loans where inside, relationship lenders and outside, non-relationship 
lenders compete to be selected by a borrower as a lead arranger of the syndication. We find that 
the probability of a non-relationship lender serving as a lead arranger is higher when media 
sentiment is more positive. 
We also consider whether the media sentiment influences the willingness of lenders to 
participate as members in a loan syndicate.  Syndicate participants face both adverse selection 
and moral hazard problems (e.g., Sufi, 2007, Ivashina, 2009), where media can influence 
lenders’ participation through either channel. We find that the probability of non-relationship 
syndicate participants joining the syndicate increases in media sentiment.  Consistent with more 
positive media sentiment reducing agency problems faced by less informed syndicate 
participants, we also show that the loan share retained by the lead arranger (i.e., the lead’s skin in 
the game) is decreasing in media sentiment. We finally document that more positive media 
sentiment is associated with lower interest rate spread. We attribute this finding to the increased 
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supply of credit available to the borrower due to more positive media sentiment attracting non-
relationship lead arrangers and syndicate participants.  
Further, we provide evidence consistent with the media being a direct source of 
information to lenders. First, we show that our results hold after controlling extensively for 
alternative public information sources, including analysts, rating agencies, and firm initiated 
press releases. Second, we show that loan origination and participation decisions, as well as the 
loan share retained by the lead arranger and loan pricing, are more sensitive to media sentiment 
when a borrower’s analyst coverage is lower and for borrowers that have experienced an 
exogenous reduction in analyst coverage preceding loan issuance. Finally, we provide evidence 
that loan spreads are more sensitive to media sentiment for consumer product oriented 
borrowers, consistent with lenders accounting for the implications of the news for consumer’ 
perception of a borrower and the resultant impact on its future sales and cash flows.  
By providing evidence that the media serves as an important information intermediary in 
the private debt market, we extend the growing body of research on the role played by the media 
in capital markets. Our findings also add to the extensive literature on syndicated lending, as we 
demonstrate that the media fundamentally alters the information structure and the nature of 
competition in the loan market. In particular, an important insight gleaned from our work is that 
not only the availability of public information about a borrower, but also its sentiment 
significantly influences the central characteristics of syndicated lending. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
 
Amount The natural logarithm of the loan amount in US dollars. 
(DealScan). 
 
Analyst Coverage  An indicator variable equal to 1 if there are any analysts 
following the firm in the month prior to the loan issuance date, 0 
otherwise (I/B/E/S). 
 
Analyst Forecast The last consensus earnings forecast prior to the loan issuance 
date (I/B/E/S). 
 
Analyst Recommendation The mean recommendation prior to the loan issuance date (1= 
Strong Buy; 2= Buy; 3= Hold; 4= Underperform; 5= sell/ 
I/B/E/S). 
 
Collateral An indicator equal to 1 if the loan is secured, 0 otherwise. 
(DealScan). 
 
Credit Rating The numerical equivalent of the senior debt rating at the time of 
a loan’s issuance. It is set as equal to 1 if the S&P senior debt 
rating is AAA, through 22 when the S&P senior debt rating is D. 
For firms not rated by S&P, we assign the Moody’s senior debt 
rating, converted to an equivalent S&P rating. For firms not 
rated by S&P or Moody’s, we assign the Fitch senior debt 
rating, converted to an equivalent S&P rating (DealScan and 
S&P historical database).     
 
ΔCredit Rating The change in the firm’s numerical credit rating over the 180-
day period prior to the loan issuance date (DealScan and S&P 
historical database). 
 
Current Outlook The variable equal to -1 (1) if a borrower is on a negative or 
developing (positive) credit outlook at a loan’s issuance date. 
The variable is equal to 0 if a borrower does not have either a 
positive or negative outlook at a loan’s issuance date (S&P 
historical database). 
 
Current Watch The variable equal to -1 (1) if a borrower is on a negative or 
developing (positive) credit watch list at a loan’s issuance date. 
The variable is equal to 0 if a borrower is not on a credit watch 
at a loan’s issuance date (S&P historical database).    
  
First Time Lead An indicator variable equal to 1 if the lender serves as the lead 
arrangers for the first time, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Forecast Revision The revision in the consensus earnings forecast over the 180 
days prior to the loan issuance date (I/B/E/S). 
 
Interest Coverage Earnings before interest and tax divided by the interest expense, 
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estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance 
(Compustat). 
 
Lead Share The share of the loan held by the lead arranger, expressed in 
percentages. 
 
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets, estimated in the quarter 
preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Loss An indicator variable equal to 1 if ROA is less than zero, 0 
otherwise (Compustat). 
 
Maturity The number of months to maturity (DealScan). 
 
Media  Sentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The average Composite Sentiment Score (CSS) over the 180 day 
period prior to a loan’s issuance date for full-size articles, 
conditional on the article’s relevance score above 75. Firm-
initiated press releases are excluded from this estimation. CSS 
combines 5 sentiment scores (PEQ, BEE, BMQ, BCA and 
BAM), while insuring that there is no sentiment disagreement 
amongst these scores. The PEQ score represents the news 
sentiment of the given news item according to the PEQ 
classifier, which specializes in identifying positive and negative 
words and phrases in articles about global equities. The BEE 
score represents the news sentiment of a given story according 
to the BEE classifier, which specializes in news stories about 
earnings evaluations. The BMQ score represents the news 
sentiment of a given story according to the BMQ classifier, 
which specializes in short commentary and editorials on global 
equity markets. The BCA score represents the news sentiment of 
a given news story according to the BCA classifier, which 
specializes in reports on corporate action announcements. The 
BAM score represents the news sentiment of a given story 
according to the BAM classifier, which specializes in news 
stories about mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. 
 
CSS scores range from 0 to 100, with a score above 50 
indicating positive news sentiment; equal to 50, neutral news 
sentiment; and below 50, negative news sentiment. We apply a 
linear transformation to the CSS score and define Media Content 
= (CSS-50)/50, so that the Media Content ranges from -1 to 1, 
with zero being equivalent to neutral sentiment (RavenPack). 
 
MTB The market value of equity divided by the book value of equity, 
estimated in the quarter preceding a loan’s issuance  
(Compustat). 
 
Negative Return An indicator variable equal to 1 if Return is less than zero, 0 
otherwise (CRSP). 
 
Borr-Lead No-Relationship An indicator variable equal to 1 if a loan’s lead arranger has 
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  syndicated less than 50 percent of a borrower’s prior loan deals 
by volume over the five year period preceding the loan issuance 
date, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Outstanding An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower’s previous deals 
are still outstanding at the current loan’s issuance date, 0 
otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Part-Borr No-Relationship 
  
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not been 
involved in a deal with the borrower over the five year period 
preceding the loan issuance date, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Part-Lead No-Relationship 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 if the participant has not been 
involved in a deal with the lead arranger over the five year 
period preceding the loan issuance date, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Prior Outlook The average of the Current Outlook variable over the 180 day 
period prior to a loan’s issuance data. Current Outlook is equal 
to -1 (1) if a borrower is on a negative or developing (positive) 
credit outlook at a loan’s issuance date. The variable is equal to 
0 if a borrower does not have either a positive or negative 
outlook at a loan’s issuance date (S&P historical database). 
 
Prior 180 Watch The average of the Current Watch variable over the 180 day 
period prior to a loan’s issuance date. Credit Watch is equal to -
1 (1) if a borrower is on a negative or developing (positive) 
credit watch at a loan’s issuance date. The variable is equal to 0 
if a borrower is not on a credit watch at a loan’s issuance date 
(S&P historical database).     
 
Press Release Sentiment The average CSS for firm-initiated press releases with a 
relevance score greater than 90, estimated over the 180 day 
period prior to a loan’s issuance date (RavenPack). 
 
PP An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan has a performance 
pricing provision, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Rated An indicator variable equal to 1 if the borrower has a senior debt 
rating from S&P, Moody’s or Fitch, zero otherwise (DealScan 
and S&P historical database).     
 
Recommendation Revision The change in the mean recommendation over the 180 days 
prior to the contract date (I/B/E/S). 
 
Revolver An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan is a revolving line of 
credit, 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Return The firm’s market-adjusted (value-weighted) cumulative return 
over the 180 day period prior to a loan’s issuance date. 
 
ROA Return on assets, defined as earnings before extraordinary items 
divided by total assets and estimated in the quarter preceding a 
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loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Spread The natural logarithm of the loan spread over LIBOR 
(DealScan). 
 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets, estimated in the quarter 
preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
Term Loan B An indicator variable equal to 1 if the loan type is Term loan B 
or below (C, D, E and F), 0 otherwise (DealScan). 
 
Tight Credit Supply An indicator variable equal to 1 if the change in bank lending 
standards for mid-sized and large commercial loans, as reported 
in the Federal Reserve Board’s quarterly Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, in the quarter of a 
loan’s origination is in the top quartile of the sample’s 
distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Time-Between The number of days between the loan’s issuance date and the 
previous deal (DealScan). 
 
Z-Score 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Altman’s (1968) bankruptcy measure, estimated by the 
following model: 
 
Z= 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 0.999X5 
 
where X1 is defined as working capital (total current asset minus 
total current liabilities) divided by total assets. X2 is defined as 
retained earnings divided by total assets. X3 is defined as 
earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets. X4 is 
the market value of equity divided by total liabilities. X5 is total 
sales divided by total assets. All measures are estimated in the 
quarter preceding a loan’s issuance (Compustat). 
 
#Article The number of full-size articles, excluding firm-initiated press 
releases, over the 180 day period prior to the loan issuance date 
(RavenPack). 
 
#Press Releases Articles The number of firm-initiated press releases over the 180 day 
period prior to the loan issuance date (RavenPack). 
 
  
#Covenants The number of financial covenants (DealScan). 
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Table 1 – Sample Selection 
 
This table presents the sample selection process.  
 
  
Number of facilities Filters  
   
Syndicated loans to public U.S. borrowers, in U.S. dollars, issued over the period 
2000-2012 
31,974 
   
After elimination of facilities of firms not covered by RavenPack  24,308 
   
After elimination of facilities with missing loan data 12,397 
   
After elimination of facilities with insufficient firm and media data 7,244 
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Table 2 – Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table provides descriptive statistics (see Table 1 for the sample selection procedure). Variables are defined in 
Appendix A.  
 
Variable N Mean Median StdDev 
Media      
   Media Sentiment 6,964 -0.0046 0.0000 0.0386 
     
Primary Loan Characteristics    
   Borr-Lead No-Relationship  7,255 0.6379 1.0000 0.4806 
   Part-Borr No-Relationship  60,082 0.5675 0.0000 0.4954 
   Part-Lead No-Relationship  60,082 0.1525 1.0000 0.3595 
   Lead Share (%) 4,613 21.0525 13.3750 20.4714 
   Spread 6,964 5.0720 5.1648 0.7221 
Firm Characteristics     
   ROA 6,964 0.0085 0.0102 0.0253 
   Interest Coverage 6,964 10.5052 2.1228 40.9157 
   Leverage 6,964 0.2520 0.2373 0.1789 
   Size 6,964 7.2521 7.2688 1.6609 
   Z-Score 6,964 2.2403 1.6907 2.2198 
   MTB 6,964 3.0102 2.0201 3.7461 
   Loss 6,964 0.1476 0.0000 0.3547 
Additional Loan Characteristics    
   Amount 6,964 18.9334 19.1138 1.4854 
   Maturity 6,964 47.9482 57.0000 21.4141 
   PP 6,964 0.7143 1.0000 0.4519 
   Collateral 6,964 0.6392 1.0000 0.4802 
   #Covenants 6,964 2.3109 2.0000 1.0131 
   Revolver 6,964 0.6229 1.0000 0.4846 
   Term Loan B 6,964 0.1002 0.0000 0.3006 
Additional Information sources    
    Press Release Sentiment 6,964 0.0243 0.0264 0.0287 
    Rated 6,964 0.5595 1.0000 0.4964 
    Analyst Coverage 6,964 0.8751 1.0000 0.3307 
Returns     
   Return 6,964 0.0558 0.0216 0.3121 
   Negative Return 6,964 0.4275 0.0000 0.4947 
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Table 3 – Media Sentiment and the Probability of a Non-Relationship Lead Arranger  
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship lender 
serving as a loan’s lead arranger. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variables   Dependent Variable: Borr-Lead No-Relationship 
Media Sentiment  1.5474** 
  (0.6393) 
Outstanding  -0.2217*** 
  (0.0808) 
Time-Between  0.0003*** 
  (0.0001) 
Tight Credit Supply  0.0280 
  (0.0656) 
ROA  0.1141 
  (0.8343) 
Interest Coverage  0.0017** 
  (0.0007) 
Leverage  -0.1801 
  (0.1812) 
Size  -0.0767** 
  (0.0305) 
Z-score  -0.0177* 
  (0.0092) 
MTB  0.0097*** 
  (0.0032) 
Loss  0.3560*** 
  (0.0811) 
Amount  -0.1487*** 
  (0.0323) 
Maturity  -0.0068*** 
  (0.0014) 
Revolver  0.1259* 
  (0.0664) 
Term Loan B  0.0462 
  (0.1045) 
Press Release Sentiment -3.1423** 
  (1.3519) 
Rated  0.0743 
  (0.0657) 
Analyst Coverage  -0.2312*** 
  (0.0872) 
Return  0.2028* 
  (0.1194) 
Negative Return  0.0244 
  (0.0707) 
    
N  7,255 
R2   0.0247 
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Table 4 – Media Sentiment and Syndicate Structure 
 
The table presents the analyses of the effects of media sentiment on the characteristics of the syndicate’s structure. 
In Column 1 (2) presents the analysis of the variable reflecting a participant’s prior relationship with the borrower 
(the lead arranger), while Column 3 presents the analysis of the loan share retained by the lead arranger. ***, **, * 
indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent Variable 
Variable 
 
Part-Borr 
No-Relationship 
Part-Lead 
No-Relationship 
Lead Share 
 
Media  Sentiment 1.7654** 2.3114** -28.7105*** 
 (0.7714) (1.1204) (6.8194) 
ROA 3.2091* -0.9517 -101.6974*** 
 (1.6573) (2.3441) (24.5548) 
Interest Coverage 0.0026** 0.0017 0.0013 
 (0.0011) (0.0014) (0.0158) 
Leverage -0.4195** 0.4476 -6.2121* 
 (0.1925) (0.3423) (3.5286) 
Size -0.1409*** -0.0646 -2.2487*** 
 (0.0301) (0.0490) (0.6833) 
Z-score 0.0641*** -0.0190 0.1689 
 (0.0192) (0.0301) (0.3279) 
MTB -0.0001 -0.0155* -0.0041 
 (0.0061) (0.0092) (0.1061) 
Loss 0.1358 0.1263 0.5926 
 (0.0833) (0.1217) (1.3263) 
Amount 0.0196 -0.0358 -5.9624*** 
 (0.0256) (0.0419) (0.6365) 
Maturity 0.0050*** -0.0041** -0.1084*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0019) (0.0329) 
Spread 0.3591*** 0.2945*** 0.1706 
 (0.0343) (0.0696) (1.0446) 
Collateral 0.1044* 0.0119 -0.2789 
 (0.0603) (0.0896) (1.1808) 
PP 0.2208*** -0.0365 -7.8570*** 
 (0.0543) (0.0896) (1.7009) 
#Covenants 0.0377 0.1479*** -0.9175* 
 (0.0287) (0.0424) (0.5226) 
Revolver -0.2142*** -0.1186** 1.0176 
 (0.0362) (0.0605) (0.9951) 
Term Loan B 0.2446*** 0.5395*** 15.4806*** 
 (0.0832) (0.1224) (2.2275) 
Borr-Lead No-Relationship 0.4786*** 0.5447*** 2.2707*** 
 (0.0440) (0.0750) (0.4899) 
First Time Lead 0.1061 1.7979*** 4.8580* 
 (0.1577) (0.3378) (2.7667) 
Press Release  Sentiment 0.0181 -0.6315 13.6202 
 (0.7750) (1.2702) (16.4236) 
Rated 0.1824*** 0.1268 -2.0909* 
 (0.0662) (0.0986) (1.1038) 
Analyst Coverage 0.0117 -0.1215 -5.0446** 
 (0.0910) (0.1569) (2.1421) 
Return 0.3726*** 0.3464** -2.7937* 
 (0.1203) (0.1755) (1.4571) 
Negative Return 0.2131*** 0.1245 0.4680 
  (0.0616) (0.0994) (0.7463) 
    
Model Logit Logit OLS 
Fixed Effects None None Year/Industry/ 
Purpose 
N 60,082 60,082 4,613 
R2 0.0561 0.0620 0.4900 
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Table 5 – Media Sentiment and Interest Rate Spread  
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the interest spread. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Variable   Dependent Variable: Spread 
Media Sentiment   -1.0930*** 
  (0.2479) 
ROA  -1.3283*** 
  (0.3475) 
Interest Coverage  0.0000 
  (0.0000) 
Leverage  0.4288*** 
  (0.0581) 
Size  -0.0396*** 
  (0.0106) 
Z-score  -0.0078** 
  (0.0035) 
MTB  -0.0076** 
  (0.0030) 
Loss  0.1287*** 
  (0.0236) 
Amount  -0.0676*** 
  (0.0078) 
Maturity  -0.0004 
  (0.0004) 
Collateral  0.5123*** 
  (0.0252) 
PP  -0.1143*** 
  (0.0192) 
#Covenants  0.0939*** 
  (0.0085) 
Revolver  -0.0733*** 
  (0.0157) 
Term Loan B  0.1725*** 
  (0.0258) 
Press Release Sentiment  -0.9077*** 
  (0.2519) 
Rated  -0.0021 
  (0.0235) 
Analyst Coverage  -0.0607*** 
  (0.0218) 
Return  0.0800*** 
  (0.0294) 
Negative Return  0.0314** 
  (0.0155) 
   
Fixed Effects  Year/Industry/Purpose 
N  6,964 
R2  0.6697 
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Table 6 – Media Sentiment, Controlling for Characteristics of Additional Public Information Sources 
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-
Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior relationship 
with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead arranger (Lead Share) and interest spread (Spread). ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
  Dependent Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable 
Borr-Lead  
No-Relationship 
Part-Borr  
No-Relationship 
Part-Lead  
No-Relationship Lead Share Spread 
Media Sentiment 2.7072** 1.1768* 2.1609* -27.5116*** -0.6652** 
 (1.313) (0.966) (1.466) (10.528) (0.305) 
#Articles -0.0007** -0.0001 0.0003 0.0025 -0.0001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Press Release Sentiment -4.9439*** 0.9792 0.7456 -18.6461 -0.6796** 
 (1.799) (1.104) (1.809) (13.188) (0.291) 
#Press Release Articles -0.0003 0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0029 0.0000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.001) 
Current Watch -0.2634* 0.0885 0.0276 -0.9182 -0.1604*** 
 (0.147) (0.105) (0.205) (1.485) (0.026) 
Prior 180 Watch 0.0460 -0.0513 -0.1795 2.3817 0.0777* 
 (0.203) (0.185) (0.230) (1.968) (0.045) 
Credit Rating 0.0190 -0.0804*** -0.0191 0.0448 0.1347*** 
 (0.016) (0.018) (0.031) (0.241) (0.010) 
Δ Credit Rating -0.0834 0.0904* 0.0399 -0.1315 -0.0040 
 (0.057) (0.053) (0.065) (0.760) (0.010) 
Current Outlook -0.0192 0.0754 -0.2443* 0.3458 -0.0565** 
 (0.109) (0.082) (0.144) (1.360) (0.028) 
Prior 180 Outlook -0.2293* -0.0498 0.2101 -0.0384 0.0213 
 (0.127) (0.099) (0.169) (1.449) (0.030) 
Analyst Forecast -0.0495** -0.0431*** -0.0560* -0.1925 -0.0050 
 (0.021) (0.014) (0.030) (0.225) (0.005) 
Forecast Revision -0.0004** -0.0031*** 0.0002*** -0.0029 0.0001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001) 
Analyst Recommendation -0.1573** -0.0483 -0.1112 0.1314 0.0294 
 (0.066) (0.051) (0.088) (0.826) (0.024) 
Recommendation Revision -0.1541 0.1069 -0.7033* 3.1323 -0.0226 
 (0.222) (0.184) (0.370) (2.552) (0.066) 
      
Model Logit Logit Logit OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included Included Included Included 
Fixed Effects None None None Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
N 4,152 46,010 46,010 3,183 4,005 
R2 0.0252 0.0601 0.0732 0.4301 0.7935 
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Table 7 – The Effect of Media Sentiment on Syndicate Structure, Conditional on 
Intensity of Analysts’ Coverage  
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead 
arranger (Lead Share) and interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage intensity. ***, 
**, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference 
across analyst coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: The probability of a non-relationship lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 2.956*** -1.3446 
 (0.908)## (1.693) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 41,760 18,322 
Pseudo R2 0.0552 0.0577 
   
 
Panel B: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the borrower, conditional 
on analyst coverage intensity 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 2.956*** -1.3446 
 (0.908)## (1.693) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 41,760 18,322 
Pseudo R2 0.0552 0.0577 
   
 
Panel C: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the lead arranger, 
conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment 2.9520** 0.6063 
 (1.259)## (1.764) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 41,760 18,322 
Pseudo R2 0.0674 0.0529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56
Table 7 (continued) – The Effect of Media Sentiment on Syndicate Structure, 
Conditional on Analysts’ Coverage Characteristics 
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead 
arranger (Lead Share) and interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage intensity. ***, 
**, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference 
across analyst coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables 
are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel D: The loan share retained by the lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
 
 Dependent Variable: Lead Share 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment -25.175*** -10.1900 
 (8.131)# (20.378) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 3,108 1,505 
R2 0.4646 0.6451 
 
 
Panel E: Loan pricing, conditional on analyst coverage intensity 
  
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable Less Intensive Coverage Highly Intensive Coverage 
Media Sentiment -1.1654*** -0.6627 
 (0.209)### (0.449) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Y/I/P Y/I/P 
Observations 5,073 1,891 
R2 0.6492 0.7580 
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Table 8 – The Effect of Media Sentiment on Syndicate Structure, Conditional on 
Analysts’ Coverage Reduction 
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead 
arranger (Lead Share) and interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage reduction. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the 
difference across analyst coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A: The probability of a non-relationship lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 1.3533* 7.9796* 
 (0.957) (5.079) # 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 6,941 314 
Pseudo R2  0.0502 0.0731 
   
 
Panel B: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the borrower, conditional 
on analyst coverage reduction 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Borr No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 1.6771** 4.1932* 
 (0.796) (2.640)# 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 56,274 3,807 
Pseudo R2 0.0571 0.0835 
   
 
Panel C: The syndicate participation of lenders without a prior relationship with the lead arranger, 
conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
 Dependent Variable: Part-Lead No-Relationship 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment 2.4008** 0.6238 
 (1.155) (3.920) 
   
Model Logit Logit 
Controls Included Included 
Observations 56,274 3,807 
Pseudo R2 0.0613 0.0873 
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Table 8 (continued) – The Effect of Media Sentiment on Syndicate Structure, 
Conditional on Analysts’ Coverage Reduction 
 
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the probability of a non-relationship 
lender serving as a loan’s lead arranger (Borr-Lead No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the borrower (Part-Borr No-Relationship), the probability a participant’s prior 
relationship with the lead arranger (Part-Lead No-Relationship), the loan share retained by the lead 
arranger (Lead Share) and interest spread (Spread), conditional on equity analysts’ coverage reduction. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the 
difference across analyst coverage partitions is significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
Panel D: The loan share retained by the lead arranger, conditional on analyst coverage 
reduction 
 
 Dependent Variable: Lead Share 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment -25.7339*** -35.0953 
 (7.144) (52.041) 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 4,417 196 
R2 0.4890 0.7396 
 
 
Panel E: Loan pricing, conditional on analyst coverage reduction 
  
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable No Coverage Reduction Coverage Reduction 
Media Sentiment -1.1771*** -3.2312** 
 (0.206) (1.396)## 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Year/Industry/Purpose Year/Industry/Purpose 
Observations 6,654 310 
R2  0.6619 0.8496 
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Table 9 – The Effect of Media Content on Loan Pricing, Conditional on a 
Borrower’s Consumer Product Intensity 
  
This table presents the analysis of the effects of media sentiment on the interest spread, conditional on a 
borrower’s consumer product intensity.  ***, **, * indicates significance at the 0.01, 0.05, 0.10 level 
respectively. ###, ##, # indicates that the difference across consumer product intensity partitions is 
significant at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
 
 Dependent Variable: Spread 
Variable Low Intensity High Intensity 
Media Sentiment -0.636** -1.0030*** 
 (0.327) (0.343)## 
   
Model OLS OLS 
Controls Included Included 
Fixed Effects Y/I/P Y/I/P 
N 3,357 3,429 
R2 0.6580 0.7107 
 
 
 
 
